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Abstract
People differ in how strongly they believe that, in general, one gets what (s)he deserves (i.e., individual differences in the 
general belief in a just world). In this study (N = 588; n = 60 with a formal autism diagnosis), whether or not autistic people 
and those with high autistic traits have a relatively low general belief in a just world is examined. The results revealed the 
expected relationship between autism/higher autistic traits and a lower general belief in a just world. In a subsample (n = 388), 
personal belief in a just world, external locus of control, and self-deception mediated this relationship. These findings are 
discussed in terms of autistic strengths (less biased information processing) and problems (lowered well-being).
Keywords Autism · Autistic traits · Belief in a just world · Locus of control · Self-deception
Introduction
Orson Welles is reported to have once said, “Nobody gets 
justice. People only get good luck or bad luck.” While we 
do not know whether Welles would have been diagnosed 
with autism, it has been argued that he might have been on 
the autism spectrum, given some biographical notes about 
his traits and behaviors (Ledgin 2002). Welles’s autism-
like personality and his views about justice might not have 
coincided purely by chance; there is possibly an underlying 
general regularity. In this sense, this work aimed to research 
whether Welles’s quote reflects a view that is common 
amongst autistic people and people high in autistic traits.
General Belief in a Just World
From a scientific perspective, there is no reason to assume 
that the world is generally just. In other words, there is no 
real evidence for a natural law within the universe that, in 
general, people get what they deserve and deserve what they 
get (the core idea of a just world; Lerner and Miller 1978; 
Lipkus 1991). In addition to the subjectivity of the cultural 
construct “deserving,” many examples speak against jus-
tice as a principle of nature (e.g., the cruel deaths of lit-
tle children reported in the news or history books). Still, 
many people stick to the idea of a just world, which has been 
extensively examined by social psychologists under the term 
(general) belief in a just world (Furnham 2003; Lerner 1980; 
Rubin and Peplau 1975; Wolfradt and Dalbert 2003).
One important reason for the general just world belief is 
that it can buffer the stress connected with the unpredictabil-
ity and threats of life (Furnham 2003; Lerner 1980). When 
believing the world is just, the future appears to be more 
controllable if acting according to accepted standards. For 
instance, for keeping the Ten Commandments (one possible 
standard people take), one could expect deserving to remain 
spared from the strokes of fate. In this view, the general 
belief in a just world is a positive, self-serving illusion, and 
individual differences in this belief have been found to be 
related to well-being (Dalbert 1998; Yu et al. 2018). How-
ever, the downside of believing in a just world is that it can 
also cause the rejection and blaming of (innocent) victims 
(Hafer 2002; Lerner and Simmons 1966; van den Bos and 
Maas 2009). Inherent to the logic of the stress-buffering 
effect, victimhood is considered to result from the violation 
of an important standard, meaning victims deserve their fate 
to some extent. In summation, believing that the world is 
generally just is a fallacy that can have both desirable and 
undesirable implications.
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Autism and Autistic Traits
Autism is diagnosed based on difficulties in social com-
munication and interaction, as well as the occurrence of 
restricted and repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013). Much research has also been focused 
on autistic traits (i.e., particularities in communication, 
social skills, imagination, attention to detail, and attention 
switching; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) as individual differ-
ence variables in non-clinical populations (e.g., Albanta-
kis et al. 2020; Bertrams and Schlegel 2020; Goris et al. 
2020). Some authors have made arguments regarding 
similarities in the behaviors and experiences of formally 
diagnosed autistic people and people high in autistic traits 
without a formal diagnosis (e.g., Poljac et al. 2012). How-
ever, the groups should not be viewed as equivalent, as 
not all people high in autistic traits qualify for the formal 
diagnosis of autism (Happé et al. 2016; see also Mottron 
and Bzdok 2020 for profound criticism of the study of 
autistic traits in contemporary autism research). Therefore, 
in autism research, it makes sense to look at both groups in 
considering whether some hypothesized relationship can 
be determined (e.g., Brosnan et al. 2016).
Autism/High Autistic Traits and Lowered General 
Belief in a Just World
This study investigated the hypothesis that formally diag-
nosed autistic people, as well as people relatively high 
in autistic traits but without a formal autism diagnosis, 
possess a lower general just-world belief than non-autistic 
people or people who are low in autistic traits, respec-
tively. This supposed difference in world views could mean 
that people with autism and high autistic traits tend to be 
more realistic and, somewhat ironically, sometimes view 
victims fairer than their non-autistic counterparts. Indeed, 
less-biased information processing has been argued and 
demonstrated to be a typical characteristic of autistic peo-
ple and those high in autistic traits (Bayesian explanatory 
approach: Karvelis et al. 2018; Pellicano and Burr 2012; 
Dual Process Theory of autism: Brosnan et al. 2016; Lew-
ton et al. 2019). In this sense, this study may relate to 
reflections on autistic strengths (e.g., Mottron 2011). On 
the other hand, it could mean that autistic people and those 
high in autistic traits do not make use of a strategy for 
self-regulating their negative affect, which could be one 
reason why autism and high autistic traits are associated 
with reduced well-being (Lord et al. 2020; Stimpson et al. 
2020). (In this regard, notably, that low well-being is more 
typical when the behavioral manifestation of autism is rel-
atively subtle, while more severe behavioral manifestations 
of autism are usually related to higher well-being within 
the autism spectrum; Kapp 2018.) Three potential reasons 
for the assumed negative relationship between autism/
autistic traits and the general just world belief were con-
sidered in this work.
Lower Personal Belief in a Just World
First, it may be that being autistic/high in autistic traits is 
also related to a lower personal belief in a just world. While 
the general belief in a just world refers to the extent to which 
individuals believe that the world is generally a just place, 
the personal belief in a just world reflects the extent to which 
they believe that they are treated fairly (Dalbert 1999). The 
personal and general beliefs in a just world are two distinct 
variables that are moderately related (Dalbert 1999; Nudel-
man et al. 2016).
Autistic people and people high in autistic traits may find 
themselves personally confronted with treatment and events 
that are not always fair and deserved. The physical environ-
ment and many social norms are generally not adapted to 
the needs of the autistic minority. Therefore, even with high 
motivation and potential to perform, autistic people struggle 
with sensory, communication, and interaction problems in 
typical working environments and often remaining unem-
ployed (Lorenz et al. 2016). At the same time, they may see 
how non-autistic people get along with much less effort. 
Similar inequality may be given in other domains of life, 
such as romantic relationships (Strunz et al. 2016). Moreo-
ver, autistic people are particularly at risk of school bullying 
victimization (Maïano et al. 2016), leaving them likely con-
fused as to why they deserve such treatment. Insofar as these 
problems have to do with autistic traits (e.g., particularities 
in communication; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), non-diagnosed 
people with high autistic traits should also be affected. If 
adverse experiences such as these cause a lower personal 
belief in a just world, it could lead affected persons to hold 
less of a belief that the world is just in general.
Higher External Locus of Control
Second, the same reasons why autistic people and people 
high in autistic traits are assumed to have a lowered personal 
belief in a just world may contribute to a higher external (or 
lower internal) locus of control. Having an external locus 
of control means that the environment, including external 
rewards and punishments, is seen as personally uncontrol-
lable. On the opposing side of this continuum, having an 
internal locus of control is the belief that the environment is 
responsive to one’s own relatively permanent characteristics 
and that one can determine one’s own rewards and punish-
ments, rather than being dependent on external forces (Rubin 
and Peplau 1975; Wang and Lv 2017).
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Autistic people can face difficulties in achieving some 
of their goals/dreams (e.g., getting or keeping a job, find-
ing a partner) due to incompatibilities between themselves 
and their social environments during communication and 
interaction (Lorenz et al. 2016; Strunz et al. 2016). Such fail-
ures may contribute to the development of an external locus 
of control (see Rotter 1966). Receiving unwanted, harmful 
treatment from the social environment (e.g., Maïano et al. 
2016) should also increase an external relative to an internal 
locus of control. In addition, Hillier et al. (2020) argued that 
autistic people perceive their control options as relatively 
low due to negative stigmatization factors; namely, they are 
more likely to receive negative signals regarding their right 
to make choices and control situations around them. Even 
though not all autistic people and people high in autistic 
traits may have such negative experiences, one can expect 
them to exhibit, on average, an elevated external locus of 
control.
An external locus of control has consistently been sub-
stantially related to a lower general belief in a just world 
(Rubin and Peplau 1975). One reason for this relationship 
may be that the stress-buffering effect of the just-world 
belief would require the subjective view that personally act-
ing according to accepted standards is generally effective.
Lower Self‑deception
The relatively reduced tendency to deceive oneself may be a 
third reason for a lower general belief in a just world. Several 
studies indicate that autistic people have an impaired ability 
for deceptive behavior (see Abe 2011). The same could be 
true for people high in autistic traits (Jameel et al. 2014). 
Recent research has called into question whether autistic 
people are less deceptive by showing that autistic and non-
autistic people did not differ in their scores on the Marlowe-
Crowne social desirability scale (Gernsbacher et al. 2020). 
However, in the previous autism-related research, scholars 
have not distinguished between the conscious deception of 
others (i.e., impression management) and the rather non-
conscious self-deception, which may have caused some 
inconsistency. The Marlowe–Crowne scale does not distin-
guish between the two factors and more strongly represents 
the conscious impression management dimension (Paulhus 
1991). Given that autism and autistic traits are related to a 
thinking style that is based on facts and rational rather than 
intuitive thought (Brosnan et al. 2016; Lewton et al. 2019), 
it can be expected that autism and higher autistic traits are 
related to lower self-deception.
Self-deception can be understood as information-process-
ing biases that give priority to welcome over unwelcome 
information, involving selective searching for and atten-
tion to information, misremembering, misinterpretation, 
and rationalization (von Hippel and Trivers 2011). In this 
way, self-deception has a beneficial function for the self and 
can foster self-confidence and optimism. Believing that the 
world is generally just may be one piece of self-deception 
for the sake of protecting one’s subjective well-being. In case 
that autistic people and people high in autistic traits are less 
susceptible to self-deception, they should also be less prone 
to belief in a just world. In other words, it is assumed that 
self-deception mediates the suspected negative relationship 
between autism/autistic traits and the general belief in a just 
world.
The Present Research
Based on this rationale, in this study, the following hypoth-
eses were examined:
(1) On average, formally diagnosed autistic people have a 
lower general belief in a just world compared to non-
autistic people.
(2) On average, people higher in autistic traits have a lower 
general belief in a just world than people lower in autis-
tic traits.
(3) The assumed negative relationship between formally 
diagnosed autism and the general belief in a just world 
is mediated by a lower personal belief in a just world, a 
higher external locus of control, and a lower proneness 
to self-deception.
(4) The assumed negative relationship between autistic 
traits and the general belief in a just world is medi-
ated by a lower personal belief in a just world, a higher 
external locus of control, and a lower proneness to self-
deception.
For this aim, autistic and non-autistic people were 
recruited from online working platforms and asked to com-
plete measures of autistic traits and the general belief in a 
just world. A subsample (including all formally diagnosed 
autistic people) also completed measures of the personal 
belief in a just world, locus of control, and self-deception. 
Furthermore, for additional analyses, age, gender, and intel-
ligent reasoning ability were assessed as control variables.
Method
Participants
The diverse sample consisted of 588 US residents, recruited 
from online working platforms (Mechanical Turk, Pro-
lific) to complete the measures of general belief in a just 
world, autistic traits, and reasoning ability. This included 
60 individuals with a formal diagnosis of autism who were 
recruited via the pre-setting on Prolific. A subsample of 388 
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participants, including the 60 autistic participants, addition-
ally completed measures of potential mediators (personal 
belief in a just world, locus of control, and self-deception). 
The participants’ sociodemographic data are presented in 
Table 1. The participation was compensated by US$2 or 
US$5, depending on the number of measures (i.e., without 
or with the measures of mediator variables).
The sample size exceeded the minimum size of N = 548 
necessary to detect at least a small-to-medium sized group 
difference (power analysis with G*Power 3.1, Faul et al. 
2007; input: t-tests, difference between two independ-
ent group means, a priori, two-tailed, d = 0.40, α = 0.05, 
1 − β = 0.80, allocation ratio n1/n2 = 9.00). The minimum 
effect size of 0.40 was chosen as the basis for calculation 
since Brysbaert (2019) concluded that it is the most rea-
sonable estimate to use when looking for a non-negligible, 
useful, or theoretically meaningful effect if one has no 
further good evidence about the effect size. The sample 
allocation ratio of 9.00 was considered as the highest 
acceptable unevenness between the two categories of a 
dichotomous variable that does not provoke deflated sta-
tistical relationships with other variables (Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2007). Moreover, the sample size was more than 
twice the size that is required for stable estimates of corre-
lations as high as the average published effect in social and 
personality psychology (r = .21; Schönbrodt and Perugini 
2013). In addition, the subsample size of n = 388 partici-
pants was sufficient for mediation analyses in which both 
path coefficients of the indirect effect were at least small-
to-medium-sized (a and b = 0.26; minimum n = 148), or 
even one of the two path coefficients was only small (a or 
b = 0.14; minimum n = 377 and 368 respectively; Fritz and 
MacKinnon 2007). Thus, the analyses were statistically 
well-powered.
Prior to the analyses, the data of 189 additionally 
recruited individuals were excluded due to potential dou-
ble participation, incomplete data, or a failed attention 
check.








Age (M ± 1SD) 37.68 ± 12.78 29.43 ± 9.20 38.62 ± 12.80
Gender
 Male 50.5% 50.0% 50.6%
 Female 49.0% 48.3% 49.1%
 Other 0.5% 1.7% 0.4%
Ethnicity
 Asian/Pacific Islander 5.6% 1.7% 6.1%
 Black 8.5% 8.3% 8.5%
 Hispanic or Latino 3.2% 3.3% 3.2%
 Native American or American Indian 0.5% 0% 0.6%
 White 77.4% 80.0% 77.1%
 Mixed 3.6% 6.7% 3.2%
 Other 1.2% 0% 1.3%
Highest level of education
 No high school diploma (or equivalent) 0.7% 1.7% 0.6%
 High school diploma 32.8% 41.7% 31.8%
 Bachelor’s degree 42.0% 31.7% 43.2%
 Postgraduate degree 18.7% 13.3% 19.3%
 Other 5.8% 11.7% 5.1%
Employment
 Self-employed 17% 8.3% 18.0%
 State-employed 5.8% 1.7% 6.3%
 Employed by private company or organization 52.7% 41.7% 54.0%
 Homemaker 3.6% 1.7% 3.8%
 Unemployed 14.3% 36.7% 11.7%
 Other 6.6% 10.0% 6.3%
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Procedure and Measures
After giving informed consent, the participants provided 
sociodemographic information (e.g., age, gender) and indi-
cated whether they were formally diagnosed with autism. 
This was followed by an attention check similarly applied in 
previous research (e.g., Bertrams and Schlegel 2020). Next, 
the subsequently described, established psychometric scales 
and the test of intelligent reasoning ability were presented 
in randomized order, each on a separate page. Finally, the 
participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated.
Global Belief in a Just World Scale (GBJWS; Reich and Wang 
2015)
This scale consists of seven items (e.g., “I feel that most peo-
ple get what they are entitled to have”) answered on seven-
point scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
For the total score, the item responses are summed, such 
that a higher total score represents a higher general belief 
in a just world. Cronbach’s α was 0.93 in the present study.
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron‑Cohen et al. 2001)
The AQ has 50 items tapping different categories of autistic 
traits (e.g., “I often notice small sounds when others do not”) 
that are rated on a four-point scale from definitely agree to 
definitely disagree. Definitely/slightly agree and definitely/
slightly disagree are awarded one and zero points, respec-
tively (or zero/one points when items are reversed), which 
are summed to form a total score. Higher scores reflect 
higher autistic traits. In this study, Cronbach’s α was 0.85.
Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (PBJWS; Dalbert 1999)
The participants respond to seven items (e.g., “I believe that, 
by and large, I deserve what happens to me”) on seven-point 
scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The 
total score is calculated by summing the answers to the 
items. A higher total score means a higher personal belief 
in a just world. For the sample in this study, Cronbach’s α 
was 0.92.
Internal–External Locus of Control Scale (I–E Scale; Rotter 
1966)
The I–E Scale has 23 items (plus six filler items that are not 
analyzed). For each item, the participants choose between 
two response options (e.g., “Many of the unhappy things 
in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck” vs. “People’s 
misfortunes result from the mistakes they make”). While 
one of the response options stands for an internal locus of 
control (assigned zero points), the other option stands for 
an external locus of control (assigned one point). As the 
points are summed for a total score, higher values represent 
a higher external locus of control. In this study, Cronbach’s 
α was 0.76.
Self‑deceptive Enhancement Subscale (SDE Subscale; 
Paulhus 1991)
This 20-item subscale is part of the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding, version 6. It measures the tendency 
for non-conscious self-deception according to how strongly 
the participants agree with exaggerated claims of positive 
cognitive attributes (e.g., “My first impressions of people 
usually turn out to be right”). The responses are given on a 
seven-point scale from 1 (not true) to 7 (very true). Points 
associated with each answer are summed across items; in 
accordance with Stöber et al. (2002), continuous scoring was 
applied in this study. Higher total scores indicate a higher 
proneness to self-deception. Cronbach’s α was 0.76 in the 
sample for this study.
Baddeley’s Grammatical Reasoning Test (BGRT; Baddeley 
1968)
For this test of intelligent reasoning ability, the participants 
are presented with items consisting of a statement that 
describes the order of two letters (A and B) using the verbs 
“precede” or “follow” in the active or passive voice and 
positively or negatively (e.g., “A does not follow B,” “B is 
preceded by A”), followed by a letter pair (“BA” or “AB”). 
For each item, participants decide as quickly as possible 
whether the statement is true or false with respect to the 
letter pair. Participants have 3 min to solve as many items 
out of 64 as possible. The number of correctly solved items 
represents the level of reasoning ability. Cronbach’s α was 
0.96 in this study.
Analysis Strategy
In order to compare means, independent samples t-tests with 
two-tailed testing were applied. Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients with two-tailed testing were calcu-
lated to examine relationships. One exception to this was 
the test for differences in gender distribution between the 
autistic and non-autistic groups with the phi coefficient. In 
all analyses, a significance level α of 0.05 was used. To test 
the robustness of differences and relationships, bootstrap-
ping was additionally applied. The mediation hypotheses 
were tested through confidence intervals based on bootstrap-
ping, making use of the statistical tool PROCESS (Hayes 
2013). Whenever bootstrapping was used in this study, it 
was bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) and based on 1000 
bootstrap samples.
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In the preliminary analyses, potential differences between 
autistic and non-autistic people in age, gender distribution, 
and reasoning ability (as a proxy of intelligence) were exam-
ined. Relationships between autistic traits as well as gen-
eral belief in a just world and these three control variables 
were also analyzed. In case any differences or relationships 
regarding the control variables emerged, additional analy-
ses were conducted in which the respective variables were 
controlled for (analysis of covariance or multiple regression 
analysis). For statistical reasons, analyses involving gender 
were conducted without the three participants who declared 
to have a non-binary gender.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Group Differences in Autistic Traits
As expected, formally diagnosed autistic people (M = 29.33, 
SD = 8.89) were higher in autistic traits than non-autistic 
people (M = 20.25, SD = 7.21; mean difference = 9.08, BCa 
95% CI [6.84, 11.35], t[586] = 9.02, p < 0.001, d = 1.23).
Group Differences in Control Variables
As shown in Table  1, on average, the autistic group 
was younger than the non-autistic group (mean differ-
ence = − 9.18, BCa 95% CI [− 11.91, − 6.36], t[586] = 5.40, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.74). There was no difference in gender dis-
tribution between the autistic and the non-autistic group 
(Φ = − 0.001, p = 0.99, BCa 95% CI [− 0.09, 0.08]). More-
over, reasoning ability was not different between autistic 
(M = 32.77, SD = 14.61) and non-autistic people (M = 34.13, 
SD = 14.36; mean difference = − 1.36, BCa 95% CI [− 4.97, 
2.84], t[586] = 0.70, p = 0.49, d = 0.10).
Relationships with Control Variables
The general belief in a just world did not correlate with age 
(r[586] = 0.07, BCa 95% CI [− 0.01, 0.16], p = 0.09). Women 
had a lower general belief in a just world (r[583] = − 0.13, 
BCa 95% CI [− 0.21, − 0.05], p = 0.002). A higher reason-
ing ability was associated with a lower general belief in a 
just world (r[586] = − 0.23, BCa 95% CI [− 0.31, − 0.16], 
p < 0.001).
Higher autistic traits correlated with lower age in the sam-
ple (r[586] = − 0.09, BCa 95% CI [− 0.17, − 0.01], p = 0.03). 
Autistic traits did not correlate with gender (r[583] = 0.001, 
BCa 95% CI [− 0.08, 0.09], p = 0.98). The higher the autistic 
traits, the higher was the reasoning ability (r[586] = 0.08, 
BCa 95% CI [0.002, 0.16], p = 0.04).
Autistic Compared to Non‑autistic People’s General 
Belief in a Just World (Hypothesis 1)
The formally diagnosed autistic individuals (M = 20.40, 
SD = 7.97) had a lower general belief in a just world than the 
non-autistic individuals (M = 27.37, SD = 9.70). The mean 
difference of − 6.97, BCa 95% CI [− 8.91, − 4.96], was 
significant (t[586] = 5.37, p < 0.001, d = 0.73).
Including Control Variables
Given that the autistic and the non-autistic groups did dif-
fer in age, and gender and reasoning ability were correlated 
with the general belief in a just world, the analysis was 
repeated with these variables as covariates. Again, autis-
tic (Madj = 20.85, SEadj = 1.22) compared to non-autistic 
(Madj = 27.36, SEadj = 0.40) people’s general belief in a just 
world was significantly lower (mean difference = − 6.51, 
BCa 95% CI [− 8.68, − 4.32], F[1, 580] = 25.41, p < 0.001, 
η2part = 0.04).
The covariate age was not significant (p = 0.13, 
η2part = 0.004); women had a lower general belief in a just 
world than men (p = 0.001, η2part = 0.02); and higher rea-
soning ability was related to a lower general belief in a just 
world (p < 0.001, η2part = 0.06).
Relationship Between Autistic Traits and General 
Belief in a Just World (Hypothesis 2)
As expected, higher autistic traits were associated with 
a lower general belief in a just world (r[586] = − 0.31, 
BCa 95% CI [− 0.38, − 0.24], p < 0.001). Both variables 
were also correlated in this way, separately, in the group 
of autistic people (r[58] = − 0.48, BCa 95% CI [− 0.67, 
− 0.26], p < 0.001) and the group of non-autistic people 
(r[526] = − 0.23, BCa 95% CI [− 0.31, − 0.15], p < 0.001).
Including Control Variables
Controlling for age, gender, and reasoning ability showed 
that autistic traits and the general belief in a just world were 
significantly negatively related beyond the control variables 
in the overall sample (B = − 0.34, BCa 95% CI [− 0.44, 
− 0.25], SE B = 0.05, β = − 0.28, p < 0.001), in the group of 
autistic people (B = − 0.37, BCa 95% CI [− 0.59, − 0.17], 
SE B = 0.10, β = − 0.42, p < 0.001), and in the group of non-
autistic people (B = − 0.28, BCa 95% CI [− 0.39, − 0.18], 
SE B = 0.06, β = − 0.21, p < 0.001).
Age was positively related to the general belief in a just 
world in the overall sample (β = 0.08, p = .04), but not in 
the separated autistic and non-autistic groups (βs = 0.21 and 
0.05, ps > 0.05). Gender and the general belief in a just world 
were related in the overall sample and in the non-autistic 
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group (βs = − 0.13 and − 0.14, ps < 0.002 [with a lower gen-
eral belief in a just world in women]), but not in the autistic 
group (β = − 0.06, p = 0.59). In all three regression analy-
ses, a higher reasoning ability was related to a lower gen-
eral belief in a just world (βs = − 0.21, − 0.29, and − 0.22, 
ps < 0.02). All overall regression models were significant 
(ps < 0.001).
Mediation Analyses (Hypotheses 3 and 4)
Personal Belief in a Just World
Formally diagnosed autistic people (M = 27.53, SD = 8.45) 
had a lower personal belief in a just world than non-autistic 
people (M = 32.80, SD = 8.31; mean difference = − 5.27, 
BCa 95% CI [− 7.55, − 2.87], t[386] = 4.50, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.63). Moreover, the higher the autistic traits, the lower 
was the personal belief in a just world (r[386] = − 0.29, 
BCa 95% CI [− 0.39, − 0.19], p < 0.001). A lower personal 
belief in a just world was also associated with a lower gen-
eral belief in a just world (r[386] = 0.69, BCa 95% CI [0.60, 
0.76], p < 0.001).
Conforming the hypothesis, the personal belief in a just 
world significantly mediated the indirect effect (ab) of the 
autism group (formally diagnosed autistic vs. non-autistic) 
on the general belief in a just world, indicated by the fact 
that the respective bootstrap interval did not include the 
null (Hayes 2013; ab = − 3.80, SE ab = 0.88, BCa 95% CI 
[− 5.41, − 2.05]). Controlling for age, gender, and reasoning 
ability did not change the result (ab = − 3.16, SE ab = 0.88, 
BCa 95% CI [− 5.03, − 1.54]).
The indirect effect between autistic traits and the general 
belief in a just world was also mediated by the personal 
belief in a just world (ab = − 0.23, SE ab = 0.05, BCa 95% 
CI [− 0.32, − 0.14]). This result held after statistically con-
trolling for age, gender, and reasoning ability (ab = − 0.21, 
SE ab = 0.04, BCa 95% CI [− 0.30, − 0.13]).
External Locus of Control
Autistic people (M = 15.28, SD = 4.79) had a higher exter-
nal locus of control than non-autistic people (M = 12.46, 
SD = 4.11; mean difference = 2.82, BCa 95% CI [1.55, 
4.09], t[386] = 4.77, p < 0.001, d = 0.67). Higher autistic 
traits were correlated with a higher external locus of control 
(r[386] = 0.29, BCa 95% CI [0.18, 0.39], p < 0.001). Further-
more, the higher the external locus of control, the lower was 
the general belief in a just world (r[386] = − 0.51, BCa 95% 
CI [− 0.58, − 0.43], p < 0.001).
External locus of control mediated the indirect effect 
between autism group and the general belief in a just world 
(ab = − 2.82, SE ab = 0.68, BCa 95% CI [− 4.24, − 1.60]). 
This mediation was also significant when age, gender, 
and reasoning ability were controlled for (ab = − 2.25, SE 
ab = 0.68, BCa 95% CI [− 3.62, − 0.90]).
Having an external locus of control also mediated the 
indirect effect between autistic traits and the general belief 
in a just world (ab = − 0.16, SE ab = 0.03, BCa 95% CI 
[− 0.23, − 0.10]). The mediation remained significant after 
statistically controlling for age, gender, and reasoning ability 
(ab = − 0.14, SE ab = 0.03, BCa 95% CI [− 0.21, − 0.08]).
Self‑deception
Self-deception was lower in formally diagnosed autistic 
people (M = 77.12, SD = 11.82) than in non-autistic people 
(M = 83.79, SD = 14.12; mean difference = − 6.67, BCa 95% 
CI [− 9.83, − 3.07], t[386] = 3.44, p < 0.001, d = 0.48). In 
addition, higher autistic traits were associated with lower 
self-deception (r[386] = −  0.36, BCa 95% CI [−  0.44, 
− 0.28], p < 0.001). When self-deception was higher, the 
general belief in a just world was also higher (r[386] = 0.40, 
BCa 95% CI [0.29, 0.51], p < 0.001).
Self-deception was a significant mediator of the relation-
ship between autism (formally diagnosed autistic people vs. 
non-autistic people) and the general belief in a just world 
(ab = − 1.60, SE ab = 0.50, BCa 95% CI [− 2.75, − 0.79]). 
This result remained robust after controlling for age, gender, 
and reasoning ability (ab = − 1.17, SE ab = 0.41, BCa 95% 
CI [− 2.07, − 0.42]).
There was also a significant mediation of the relation-
ship between autistic traits and the general belief in a just 
world via self-deception (ab = − 0.15, SE ab = 0.03, BCa 
95% CI [− 0.22, − 0.09]). The mediation was significant 
even after controlling for age, gender, and reasoning ability 
(ab = − 0.12, SE ab = 0.03, BCa 95% CI [− 0.18, − 0.07]).
Discussion
Study Findings
The results from this study revealed that, on average, for-
mally diagnosed autistic people and people high in autistic 
traits possessed a lower general belief in a just world than 
people without an autism diagnosis or lower autistic traits. 
Thus, autistic individuals are less likely to believe in the 
view that people get what they deserve and deserve what 
they get. As expected, this relationship was mediated by a 
lower personal belief in a just world, a higher external (or 
lower internal) locus of control, and a lower tendency for 
self-deception. This pattern held even when controlling for 
the potential influences of age, gender, and intelligent rea-
soning ability.
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Implications
The findings have various implications. First, they deliver a 
novel mosaic piece regarding autistic personality. Whether 
one believes that the world is just or not is a fundamental 
basis from which perceptions and decisions are made in 
everyday life (Ross and Miller 2002). For instance, people 
with a lower belief in a just world are less socially accom-
modating (Lipkus and Bissonnette 1996) and less biased by 
others’ group memberships when judging them (Freeman 
2006). A tendency toward less diplomacy and less biased 
information processing have also been found in autistic 
people or people high in autistic traits (Baron-Cohen et al. 
2001; Brosnan et al. 2016; Karvelis et al. 2018; Lewton et al. 
2019; Pellicano and Burr 2012). Such autistic characteristics 
could partly result from their lesser illusion of a just world. 
With a low general belief in a just world, one cannot rely on 
the forsaking of one’s self-interest to be rewarded in return, 
which lowers the perceived benefit of accommodation (Lip-
kus and Bissonnette 1996). Moreover, without the belief that 
people get what they deserve, group memberships (e.g., low 
socioeconomic status) are not considered valid deliverables 
of information about others’ traits (Freeman 2006). It is pos-
sible that some experiences and behaviors typical for autism 
and high autistic traits are not directly caused by the autistic 
traits but mediated by a relatively low general belief in a 
just world.
Furthermore, these results point to a crucial autistic 
strength, namely, the ability to see things in an unbiased, 
realistic manner. In line with this view, previous researchers 
have shown that autistic people are less susceptible to the 
framing effect (De Martino et al. 2008) and the conjunction 
fallacy (Morsanyi et al. 2010) and that they are even less 
likely to succumb to visual illusions induced by top-down 
processes such as the Shepard Illusion (Mitchell et al. 2010) 
and the Kanisza Triangle (Happé 1996). The general belief 
in a just world may be another kind of fallacy or illusion to 
which autistic people are relatively immune. The evidence 
from this study suggests that lower susceptibility to some 
biases is essentially based on a lower tendency for self-
deception. This attribute, in combination with their tendency 
to be undiplomatic, may make autistic people and people 
high in autistic traits valuable consultants whenever impor-
tant decisions are made. History shows that self-deception 
occurs even on a grand scale and can lead to catastrophic 
decisions if not cleared up (e.g., the Challenger disaster; 
Trivers 2000).
However, there is also a downside. The general belief 
in a just world is considered to be a positive illusion that 
can increase subjective well-being (Dalbert 1998; Yu et al. 
2018). The same applies to self-deception in general (Hage-
dorn 1996). Therefore, the present findings point to a pos-
sible reason why people with relatively subtle behavioral 
manifestations of autism and people high in autistic traits 
tend to have lowered subjective well-being (Kapp 2018; 
Lord et al. 2020; Stimpson et al. 2020): They deceive them-
selves too little in a positive direction, that is, they are too 
realistic. This refers to a dilemma that was symbolically 
portrayed by the blue and red pills in ‘The Matrix.’ Taking 
the blue pill stands for shutting oneself off mentally from 
the troubling elements of reality, which involves ignorance; 
taking the red pill stands for an unembellished view of real-
ity, which can result in considerable discomfort. In interven-
tions designed to help autistic people, solutions should be 
sought that appreciate their less-biased view of themselves 
and the world while still recognizing this as one potential 
cause of distress. In addition, their lower personal belief in 
a just world and higher external (or lower internal) locus of 
control can be based on valid grounds (e.g., Maïano et al. 
2016) and can also contribute to lowered subjective well-
being (Dalbert 1999; Klonowicz 2001). Therefore, consider-
ing the manifestations of these variables and the underlying 
reasons should additionally be a part of mental health sup-
port services.
Limitations and Future Research
The findings of this study are limited in generalizability, as 
they are based on a convenient online sample that is sup-
posedly not representative of the various autistic people; 
particularly, autistic people with additional intellectual dis-
abilities were very likely underrepresented. Moreover, for 
reasons of anonymity and data protection, the stated formal 
diagnoses of autism could not be verified online (e.g., via 
uploaded documents). These are important limitations that 
are common in autism research (e.g., Livingston et al. 2020; 
Ola and Gullon-Scott 2020). Another limiting methodologi-
cal aspect of this study is that the present findings rest on 
cross-sectional data. Future research should overcome these 
drawbacks by applying more targeted methods of data col-
lection and measures that are less dependent on verbal-report 
skills than the typical self-report questionnaires. Longitudi-
nal designs may provide further insights into the assumed 
causal relationships (Duckworth et al. 2010).
It should also be mentioned that the conceptualization 
and measurement of autistic traits, which was used in this 
study, has recently been questioned (Mottron and Bzdok 
2020). Possibly, the sum of several self-reported traits, con-
sidered as representing a specific point on a continuum of 
being more or less autistic, is actually not informative with 
regard to clinical autism. In other words, autistic traits (as 
measured by the AQ) and clinical autism could be on quali-
tatively different dimensions. It remains to be seen how the 
scientific debate develops in this respect and which concept 
of autistic traits prevails in the future. If necessary, parts of 
the results of the present study may have to be re-evaluated.
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Furthermore, some assumptions that have been made still 
need empirical examination; for instance, future research 
should directly test whether the usual experiences of autis-
tic people and people high in autistic traits actually cause 
a lower personal belief in a just world and a higher exter-
nal locus of control. In addition, the consequences of a low 
general belief in a just world (e.g., lowered well-being, less 
victim-blaming) have been documented in the literature 
(Dalbert 1998; Hafer 2002; Lerner and Simmons 1966; van 
den Bos and Maas 2009; Yu et al. 2018); however, it is pos-
sible that the underlying psychological processes are dif-
ferent for autistic people. Therefore, further research is still 
needed to reveal the effects of a lower belief in a just world 
in autistic people and people high in autistic traits.
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